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The Sometimes-Bumpy Stream of Commerce
Clause Doctrine
Richard D. Friedman*
The title of this essay is a somewhat feeble use of an un-
original pun.' I am not talking about the doctrine of the stream,
but about the stream of the doctrine. That is, my principal sub-
ject is not the "stream of commerce doctrine," but rather the his-
torical development of the doctrine governing Congress's power
under the Commerce Clause in the twentieth century, and espe-
cially in the years centering on the New Deal. My basic thesis is
this: Although the doctrine developed rapidly in the New Deal
era, there were no major discontinuities in it. That does not
mean that it did not change, or that it only changed in a smooth
fashion. Rather, I believe it developed throughout the twentieth
century the way much legal doctrine develops, with a series of
intellectually undramatic changes that cumulatively caused an
enormous transformation in the effect of the doctrine. 2 The de-
velopment may be regarded as a drift towards an equilibrium
that was set in motion by the conceptualization of the Commerce
Clause in the nineteenth century, as allowing congressional
regulation not only of that which is commerce, but also of that
* Copyright © 2003 Richard D. Friedman. Ralph W. Aigler Professor of Law,
University of Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48104; rdfrdman@umich.edu;
(734) 647-1078. Thanks to Richard Primus and to participants in The Commerce Clause.
Past, Present, and Future, a symposium hosted by the University of Arkansas School of
Law in Fayetteville, Arkansas.
1. See Barry Cushman, A Stream of Legal Consciousness. The Current of Commerce
Doctrine from Swift to Jones & Laughlin, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 105 (1992).
2. At the conference at which this paper was presented, Mark Brandon mentioned
the very analogy that I had in mind: the development of products liability doctrine in the
early twentieth century. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916), is
often regarded as the decisive case in the rejection of the privity requirement. But, while
Benjamin Cardozo's opinion in MacPherson presented a new rule, it did so "in the most
modest terms," and it drew heavily on New York precedents that "supported his argument"
and "made the innovation less striking than it would have been elsewhere." ANDREW L.
KAUFMAN, CARDOZO 273 (1998). Thus, as Professor Brandon pointed out, even though
MacPherson led to a substantially different view of the field, in itself it was an incremen-
talist decision.
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which is not commerce but which has a sufficient impact on
commerce. Furthermore, though for nearly sixty years the limi-
tations on the doctrine never posed a practical constraint on
Congress, the Court continued to articulate a theoretical con-
straint. That theoretical constraint was available to be invoked
at the end of the twentieth century, without doing dramatic vio-
lence to pre-existing doctrine, by a Court inclined to impose
federalism-related constraints on Congress.
In short, I contend that the development of Congress's
power under the Commerce Clause in the twentieth century was
like a stream, mainly continuous, sometimes winding, but head-
ing primarily in one direction, with some bumpy patches of
rapid movement and small cascades or discontinuities, but with-
out major breaks. Thus, I believe Justice Thomas erred when he
suggested in United States v. Lopez3 that the critical New Deal
cases were the result of a "wrong turn" that departed dramati-
cally from a century and a half of precedent.4 They were instead
a rather natural development that built on the broad structure of
Commerce Clause doctrine as it had developed over the previ-
ous century, and rejected one doctrinal feature that no longer fit
well within that structure.
At the outset, I will lay out a simple conceptual framework.
The law develops in a smooth or continuous fashion when it
adopts propositions that were predictable on the basis of prior
law. Note that to adopt the most predictable position does not
mean that the law remains static; it is a development if the Su-
preme Court makes clear and certain what previously seemed
most likely-and in doing so, the Court may make plausible fur-
ther propositions that previously seemed improbable. A discon-
tinuity occurs when the Court adopts a proposition that previ-
ously appeared to be contrary to the law. But the discontinuity
is not a major one unless it involves a significant alteration of
the underlying framework.
I. THE EFFECTS DOCTRINE
I contend that the basic framework that still governs Con-
gress's power under the Commerce Clause is the one suggested,
3. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
4. Id at 599 (Thomas, J., concurring).
982
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albeit ambiguously, by John Marshall. Marshall could have de-
fined that power in terms of its object. That is, he could have
declared that when the Constitution provides that Congress has
power "[t]o regulate Commerce ... among the several States,"
5
it means what it says. "Commerce" is the object of the verb
"[t]o regulate," and so Marshall could have concluded that to fit
within the authorization, an invocation of the power must oper-
ate on what is deemed to be interstate commerce. To the argu-
ment that such a conception would be unduly cramping, that it
would not enable Congress to protect interstate commerce or
even to fully achieve the objectives that motivated it to regulate
that commerce, one might imagine a response that, whatever the
merits of such a system, it is not the one the Constitution pro-
vides.
6
But this, of course, is not what Marshall did. In familiar
language in Gibbons v. Ogden,7 after emphasizing that "the ex-
clusively internal commerce of a State" lies beyond congres-
sional power, he wrote:
The genius and character of the whole government seem to
be, that its action is to be applied to all the external con-
cems of the nation, and to those internal concerns which af-
fect the States generally; but not to those which are com-
pletely within a particular State, which do not affect other
States, and with which it is not necessary to interfere, for
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
6. Compare, for example, two passages from opinions by Chief Justice Hughes in
critical cases in the 1930s. In Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
(1935), responding to an argument suggesting implicitly "that the federal authority under
the commerce clause should be deemed to extend to the establishment of rules to govern
wages and hours in intrastate trade and industry generally throughout the country," he
wrote for the Court: "It is not the province of the Court to consider the economic advan-
tages or disadvantages of such a centralized system. It is sufficient to say that the Federal
Constitution does not provide for it." Id. at 549. And in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298
U.S. 238 (1936), he wrote:
If the people desire to give Congress the power to regulate industries within the
State, and the relations of employers and employees in those industries, they are
at liberty to declare their will in the appropriate manner, but it is not for the
Court to amend the Constitution by judicial decision.
Id. at 318 (Hughes, C.J., separate opinion).
7. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
2003] 983
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the purpose of executing some of the general powers of the
government. 8
The clear implication is that interstate commerce is the subject
of the power: Congress may regulate a matter that is not itself
commerce, even though it may be characterized as an "internal"
concern of a state, if it affects other states in a sufficient way.
Later cases made the implication more explicit.9 (Thus, the
implicit suggestion by Justice Thomas in United States v. Lo-
pez 1° that the only historical basis for an expansive reading of
,pez 11the commerce power is a generous reading of Gibbons is mis-
taken.) For example, in The Daniel Ball, 2 the Court said that
the commerce power
authorizes all appropriate legislation for the protection or
advancement of either interstate or foreign commerce, and
for that purpose such legislation as will insure the conven-
ient and safe navigation of all the navigable waters of the
United States, whether that legislation consists in requiring
the removal of obstructions to their use, in prescribing the
form and size of the vessels employed upon them, or in
subjecting the vessels to inspection and license, in order to
insure their proper construction and equipment. "The
power to regulate commerce," this court said in Gilman v.
8. Id. at 195. Note also that in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316
(1819), Marshall justified the creation of the United States Bank in part on the basis of its
potential for promoting commerce: "It has ... a close connection with the power of regu-
lating foreign commerce, and that between the different states. It provides a circulating
medium, by which that commerce can be more conveniently carried on, and exchanges
may be facilitated." Id. at 389. In addition, he pointed out that "light-houses, beacons,
buoys and public piers, have all been established, under the general power to regulate
commerce." Id. at 385. Such facilities were "not indispensably necessary to commerce,"
but protected it from peril. Id.
9. United States v. Coombs, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 72 (1838), an opinion for the Court by
Justice Story, written shortly after Marshall's death, is noteworthy in articulating that Con-
gress's power reaches activities that obstruct commerce or the exercise of the power itself
Story wrote that the power
extends to such acts, done on land, which interfere with, obstruct, or prevent the
due exercise of the power to regulate commerce and navigation with foreign na-
tions, and among the states. Any offence which thus interferes with, obstructs,
or prevents such commerce and navigation, though done on land, may be pun-
ished by congress, under its general authority to make all laws necessary and
proper to execute their delegated constitutional powers.
Id. at 78.
10. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
11. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 593-96 (Thomas, J., concurring).
12. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1871).
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Phila., "comprehends the control for that purpose, and to
the extent necessary, of all navigable waters of the United
States which are accessible from a State other than those in
which they lie. For this purpose they are the public prop-
erty of the nation, and subject to all the requisite legislation
of Congress."' 
3
Thus, if a state authorized the construction of a low bridge over
a navigable waterway, Congress might deem it to be an obstruc-
tion to interstate commerce and inimical to a policy that the wa-
terway be kept open. 14 The bridge was an obstruction to com-
merce. The fact that it was not itself part of interstate
commerce, any more than rocks in a harbor would be, did not
undercut the legitimacy of federal power.
Exercises of Congress's commerce power throughout most
of the nineteenth century tended not to press the limits of this
doctrine. But the doctrine was firmly established. Consider,
then, the early twentieth century case of Southern Railway Co. v.
United States.15 That case involved a challenge to a federal act
requiring safety appliances on rolling stock used on any railway
engaged in interstate commerce, regardless of whether the par-
ticular vehicle was moving interstate. The Court upheld the law,
and in doing so declared that Congress may protect interstate
commerce "no matter what may be the source of the dangers
which threaten it."' 6 All that was necessary was that there be "a
real or substantial relation or connection between" the require-
ment of the legislation and the safety of interstate commerce and
of those who were engaged in it. 17 That language, viewing the
matter as one of degree, is especially interesting, given that the
Court sometimes insisted that only direct effects would qualify.
And the interest is enhanced by the facts that the decision was
unanimous, and that the opinion was issued by Justice Willis
13. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) at 564 (quoting Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70
U.S. (3 Wall.) 713, 724-25 (1866)) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
14. Cf Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518
(1852) (holding that a low bridge over the Ohio River at Wheeling, authorized by Virginia,
was a violation of congressional policy favoring unimpeded traffic on the Ohio).
15. 222 U.S. 20 (1911).
16. Id. at 27.
17. Id. at 26.
2003] 985
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Van Devanter, who in the 1930s was one of the four Justices
most resistant to expansive uses of the commerce power.'8
Three years later, in the Shreveport Rates Cases,19 the
Court developed the doctrine in a significant way. In Shreve-
port, the Interstate Commerce Commission had barred carriers
from charging lower rates for an intrastate route than for a com-
peting interstate route, and in doing so relieved the carriers from
a state order governing the intrastate route. The Court upheld
the order, in an opinion by Justice Hughes, with Justices Lurton
and Pitney dissenting silently (and probably on non-
constitutional grounds). 20  Hughes wrote that congressional
power,
extending to these interstate carriers as instruments of inter-
state commerce, necessarily embraces the right to control
their operations in all matters having such a close and sub-
stantial relation to interstate traffic that the control is essen-
tial or appropriate to the security of that traffic, to the effi-
ciency of the interstate service, and to the maintenance of
conditions under which interstate commerce may be con-
ducted upon fair terms and without molestation or hin-
drance.
2 1
The logic was that regulation of the intrastate route was neces-
sary to achieve effective regulation of the interstate route. There
are two moves here of great importance. One, the Federal Gov-
ernment was allowed to regulate an intrastate activity not so
much because, as matters stood previously, that activity was ad-
18. Note also Mondon v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co., 223 U.S. 1
(1912), sometimes referred to as the Second Employers' Liability Cases, in which Van
Devanter, again for a unanimous Court, upheld imposition of liability for injury to an em-
ployee engaged in interstate commerce, even though the negligent employee was not so
engaged. Echoing Southern Railway, Van Devanter wrote that Congress can protect inter-
state commerce "no matter what the source of the dangers which threaten it." Id. at 5 1. Of
particular interest, the future Justice McReynolds-the most conservative of the "Four
Horsemen" of the 1930s-appeared for the United States as a Special Assistant to the At-
torney General in defense of the statute. See Supplemental Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae, Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1912) (No. 11-120).
19. 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
20. This is a matter of speculation, but the most dubious, vulnerable, defensive, and
arguably overreaching portion of Hughes's opinion appears to be the one in which-after
resolving the issue of constitutional power-he holds inapplicable a statutory proviso that
the Commission's authority does not extend to "the transportation of passengers or prop-
erty... wholly within one State." id. at 356, 358.
21. Id. at 351 (emphasis added).
986
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versely affecting interstate commerce itself, but because that ac-
tivity would make less effective, or intolerably unfair, the fed-
eral regulation of commerce.22 This principle was in accordance
with earlier articulations of the power,23 but the Shreveport case
provided a striking application of it. Second, the impact that the
intrastate activity would have on interstate commerce as regu-
lated was not a physical obstruction, like a rock or low bridge,
but rather a predictable and immediate economic effect.
24
These are developments of great significance. But notice
that they are, in the terms I have used, smooth or continuous.
There is nothing in them that contradicted prior law. They flow
perfectly well with the conception of prior doctrine. If Congress
can regulate something that is not commerce because that some-
thing adversely affects commerce, it makes perfect sense that it
should be able to take into account not only how that something
affects commerce as it stood, but also commerce as it would
stand after the regulation, and so ensure that the regulation does
not fail to achieve its purpose or yield unacceptable results. And
if Congress can clear away obstructions to commerce, there is
no good reason why an economic obstruction is beyond its
power. Neither the language nor the logic of prior decisions
suggested that economic obstructions were beyond congres-
sional power; indeed, the language had been general and capa-
cious. Earlier Courts may have had only physical obstructions
in mind, because that is what Congress's focus had been. But
they did not limit their holdings to physical obstructions, and as
22. See id at 351-52. Specifically, Justice Hughes wrote:
Wherever the interstate and intrastate transactions of carriers are so related that
the government of the one involves the control of the other, it is Congress, and
not the State, that is entitled to prescribe the final and dominant rule, for other-
wise Congress would be denied the exercise of its constitutional authority, and
the State, and not the Nation, would be supreme within the national field.
Id.
23. See, e.g., supra note 9.
24. This is a point that was recognized by Justice Jackson's opinion for the Court in
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942): "The Court's recognition of the relevance of the
economic effects in the application of the Commerce Clause, exemplified by this statement
[the one quoted above from Shreveport], has made the mechanical application of legal
formulas no longer feasible." Id. at 123-24.
9872003]
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Congress began to widen its sights, the doctrine was ready to ac-
commodate the new exercises of power.
25
II. PRODUCTION
The Court decided the Shreveport Rate Cases26 even while
adhering to a doctrine of long standing: that production was not
commerce, 27 and so was beyond the reach of Congress. That
doctrine had been enunciated repeatedly in the nineteenth cen-
tury, and as Barry Cushman has emphasized, 28 its principal ef-
fect then was to ensure that the states had the ability to regulate
production. Judges then tended to speak of the Commerce
Clause as having created two mutually distinct spheres, so that if
production was in the state sphere it could not be within Con-
gress's power.29 (They sometimes worked their way out of this
25. Barry Cushman is correct that the immediate significance of Shreveport was con-
fined by the fact that congressional regulations also had to satisfy the Court's due process
standards. Barry Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence,
67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1089, 1131 (2000). But Hughes did not refer to those standards, which
even during the height of the Lochner period were more nebulous than is often recognized.
Cushman points out that until the mid-1930s, Shreveport was only cited in cases involving
an industry that was classically regarded as being "affected with a public interest," and so
subject to rate regulation under then-prevailing due-process standards: railroads. 1d. But
the applicability of Shreveport was not limited in theory to those industries, and when it did
come into force in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 38 (1937), its appli-
cability did not depend on the overthrow, in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), of
the "affected with a public interest" doctrine; neither Nebbia nor that doctrine were cited in
the majority opinion or in the dissent in Jones & Laughlin, which was not a price-
regulating case.
26. 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
27. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, New Evidence of the Original Meaning of the Com-
merce Clause, 55 ARK. L. REV. 847 (2003).
28. See Cushman, supra note 25, at 1121.
29. For instance, in a celebrated passage in Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888), the
first Justice Lamar said:
No distinction is more popular to the common mind, or more clearly expressed
in economic and political literature, than that between manufacture and com-
merce. Manufacture is transformation-the fashioning of raw materials into a
change of form for use. The functions of commerce are different. The buying
and selling and the transportation incidental thereto constitute commerce; and
the regulation of commerce in the constitutional sense embraces the regulation at
least of such transportation .... If it be held that the term includes the regulation
of all such manufactures as are intended to be the subject of commercial transac-
tions in the future, it is impossible to deny that it would also include all produc-
tive industries that contemplate the same thing. The result would be that Con-
gress would be invested, to the exclusion of the States, with the power to
regulate, not only manufactures, but also agriculture, horticulture, stock-raising,
domestic fisheries, mining-in short, every branch of human industry. For is
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constraint by saying that a state regulation that in itself was not
deemed to be a regulation of commerce would not be rendered
invalid by the fact that it had some incidental effect on com-
merce.) 30  It made sense that the states retained control of pro-
duction, not only because it occurred locally but also because
regulations of production, unlike regulations of sales, ordinarily
would not be protectionist; if they had any competitive impact at
all, it would ordinarily be to weaken, not strengthen, the com-
petitive position of the local producer who was subject to the
regulation.
Near the end of the nineteenth century, the Court applied
the production doctrine with a vengeance in a celebrated case
involving federal powers, United States v. E.C. Knight Co.3
That case involved the Federal Government's attempt to apply
the then-new Sherman Act to the Sugar Trust. The Court pro-
nounced, in line with the prevailing doctrine "Commerce suc-
ceeds to manufacture, and is not a part of it." But its applica-
tion of the principle was rather daring. It said that acts charged
"related exclusively" to the acquisition of refineries in Philadel-
phia and to "the business of sugar refining in Pennsylvania," and
that they "bore no direct relation to commerce between the
States or with foreign nations"; the fact "that trade or commerce
might be indirectly affected" did not avail the Government.
33
Knight had little persistent effect in hampering Government
actions under the Sherman Act against production monopolies
(that is, combinations of producers, or the resultant dominant
producer); in this context, it was soon rendered a virtual nul-
there one of them that does not contemplate, more or less clearly, an interstate or
foreign market? Does not the wheat grower of the Northwest, and the cotton
planter of the South, plant, cultivate, and harvest his crop with an eye on the
prices at Liverpool, New York, and Chicago? The power being vested in Con-
gress and denied to the States, it would follow as an inevitable result that the
duty would devolve on Congress to regulate all of these delicate, multiform, and
vital interests-interests which in their nature are and must be, local in all the
details of their successful management.
Id. at 20.
30. See Cushman, supra note 25, at 1116 n. 130. Such manipulation of doctrinal cate-
gories is, of course, a common response of courts when those categories do not adequately
perform the "mapping function" of determining cases in accordance with underlying poli-
cies.
31. 156 U.S. I (1895).
32. Id. at 12.
33. Id. at 17.
2003] 989
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lity.34  Moreover, it became clear that Congress could regulate
commerce in a way that would have a significant impact on pro-
duction, and numerous applications of the antitrust laws did just
that. And, for that matter, the Court was willing, consistent with
the language of Knight, to apply the antitrust laws to enjoin col-
laborative obstructions to commerce-most notably by unions-
that operated on production, so long as it was able to perceive an
intent to restrain interstate commerce. 35  The Court sometimes
34. See N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904). Specifically, the Court
noted:
In United States v. E. C. Knight Co. it was held that the agreement or arrange-
ment there involved had reference only to the manufacture or production of
sugar by those engaged in the alleged combination; but if it had directly em-
braced interstate or international commerce, it would then have been covered by
the anti-trust act and would have been illegal ....
Id. at 329 (plurality opinion). That the Northern Securities decision contradicted Knight, or
very nearly did so, was a theme of Justice Holmes's dissent. Id at 410 (Holmes, J., dis-
senting); see also Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 68-69 (1911) (noting that
the company's arguments under Knight "have been so repeatedly pressed upon this court in
connection with the interpretation and enforcement of the Anti-Trust Act, and have been so
necessarily and expressly decided to be unsound as to cause the contentions to be plainly
foreclosed and to require no express notice"); cf Indus. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 64
(1925). In Industrial Ass 'n, the Court held the Sherman Act inapplicable to a combination
intended to enforce an agreement to require "open shop" policies among building contrac-
tors by granting only to contractors implementing such policies permits for certain materi-
als. Id. at 77. According to the Court,
Interference with interstate trade was neither desired nor intended. On the con-
trary, the desire and intention was to avoid any such interference, and, to this
end, the selection of materials subject to the permit system was substantially
confined to California productions. The thing aimed at and sought to be attained
was not restraint of the interstate sale or shipment of commodities, but was a
purely local matter, namely, regulation of building operations within a limited
local area, so as to prevent their domination by the labor unions. Interstate
commerce, indeed, commerce of any description, was not the object of at-
tack ....
Id; see also infra note 35.
35. See, e.g., Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295, 310 (1925)
[hereinafter Coronado 11] (noting that the "mere reduction in the supply of an article to be
shipped in interstate commerce by the illegal or tortious prevention of its manufacture or
production is ordinarily an indirect and remote obstruction to that commerce"; adding,
however, that "when the intent of those unlawfully preventing the manufacture or produc-
tion is shown to be to restrain or control the supply entering and moving in interstate com-
merce, or the price of it in interstate markets, their action is a direct violation of the Anti-
Trust Act"); United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 409 (1922) [here-
inafter Coronado I] (noting that if the evidence supported a finding that the national body
had attempted by unlawful means "to unionize mines whose product was important, actu-
ally or potentially, in affecting prices in interstate commerce," then there would be an ac-
tionable conspiracy under the Sherman Act, but ruling that the evidence did not support a
HeinOnline  -- 55 Ark. L. Rev.  990 2002-2003
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brought such cases within the direct-indirect framework of
Knight by speaking of intent to obstruct interstate commerce as
creating a direct impact on that commerce.
36
But the underlying conception remained that production
was not commerce, and so not subject to federal power. Indeed,
though in Swift & Co. v. United States37 and subsequent cases
the Court articulated the theory that activities within the "stream
of commerce" fell within the commerce power, this theory was
very limited, and would not overcome the doctrine that produc-
tion was not commerce. 38  And so strong was this conception
holding that such a motive actuated "every lawless strike of a local and sporadic charac-
ter"). These and other cases are analyzed tellingly in Cushman, supra note 25, at 1094-99.
36. See, e.g., Coronado I, 259 U.S. at 408 (stating that "[o]bstruction to coal mining
is not a direct obstruction to interstate commerce in coal, although it, of course, may affect
it by reducing the amount of coal to be carried in that commerce"; holding that for a con-
spiracy to obstruct interstate commerce to be punishable under the commerce power, "the
intent to injure, obstruct, or restrain interstate commerce must appear as an obvious conse-
quence of what is to be done, or be shown by direct evidence or other circumstance");
United Leather Workers Int'l Union v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co., 265 U.S. 457 (1924)
(stating that it is "only when the intent or necessary effect upon [interstate] commerce in
the article is to enable those preventing the manufacture to monopolize the supply, control
its price or discriminate as between its would-be purchasers, that the unlawful interference
with its manufacture can be said directly to burden interstate commerce").
37. 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
38. See Arkadelphia Milling Co. v. St. Louis Southwestern Railway Co., 249 U.S. 134
(1919), stating:
It is not merely that there was no continuous movement from the forest to the
points without the State, but that when the rough material left the woods it was
not intended that it should be transported out of the State, or elsewhere beyond
the mill, until it had been subjected to a manufacturing process that materially
changed its character, utility, and value.
Id. at 151. Cushman has pointed out that the lumber in Arkadelphia had not moved across
state lines before reaching the mill, unlike many of the raw materials in NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). See Cushman, supra note 25, at 1119-20. The
distinction does not seem to be important. The key is that, in Arkadelphia, as in Jones &
Laughlin, the producer transformed the character of the materials in a significant way. In
Industrial Ass 'n, holding that the Sherman Act did not apply to a California-based conspir-
acy though the conspiracy concerned, in part, plaster that had been produced in other states
and shipped into California, the Court noted that the conspiracy reached only "such plaster
as previously had been brought into the state and commingled with the common mass of
local property, and in respect of which, therefore, the interstate movement and the inter-
state commercial status had ended." 268 U.S. at 78-79. The situation was therefore "ut-
terly unlike" that presented in Swift and the similar case of Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S.
495 (1922), where "the only interruption of the interstate transit of live stock being that
necessary to find a purchaser at the stockyards, and this the usual and constantly recurring
course." Indus. Ass 'n, 268 U.S. at 79.
Note further that in Jones & Laughlin, the company relied heavily on Arkadelphia in
its brief. Brief for Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. at 27, 66, 81, 95, NLRB v. Jones &
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that, in Hammer v. Dagenhart,39 it led a majority of the Court to
invalidate a federal statute prohibiting the shipment in interstate
commerce of goods that had been produced in violation of child
labor standards set out by the statute-notwithstanding the well-
established principle, articulated by Justice Holmes for four Jus-
tices, that Congress could, in effect, stand astride state lines and
decide what goods could not4ass, even though doing so effec-
tively overcame state policy. The majority was unwilling to
countenance the possibility that all production of goods intended
for interstate commerce could be subject to federal control.
Ill. CONFRONTATION
Thus, in the pre-New Deal years, there was substantial ten-
sion in the doctrine. On the one hand, Congress could regulate
matters that were not interstate commerce so long as they had a
sufficient impact on that commerce. On the other hand, though
Congress could regulate obstructions to commerce that operated
by impairing production, it could not regulate production itself.
One or the other of these principles would have to give way.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,41 in which the
Court invalidated the President's code-making authority under
the National Industrial Recovery Act, 42 did not provide a good
opportunity to resolve the tension. The extraordinary breadth of
the authority was upsetting to all the justices, and they held
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (No. 419), reprinted in 33 LANDMARK BRIEFS
AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 308 (Philip B. Kur-
land & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975) [hereinafter LANDMARK BRIEFS]. The Board made
only a cursory attempt to distinguish the case at argument. See Tr. of Oral Arguments,
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (No. 419), reprinted in
LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 38, at 451 (reporting argument of chairman of the Board
distinguishing Arkadelphia as "simply another illustration of something which may or may
not have been in the flow of commerce but which certainly was not in transit"). Counsel
for the company argued briefly but effectively against the contention that the company's
productive activities lay in the stream of commerce, invoking the doctrine on which Arka-
delphia relied that a transformation in character halted the stream of commerce. See id. at
470 (quoting Earl F. Reed, Jr., as saying, "This mill is not in any way stationed in the
stream of commerce. This plant, into which we take coal and coke and limestone and turn
out steel, is not any mere temporary stoppage in a stream of commerce coming from the
West to the East.").
39. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
40. Id. at 277-79 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
41. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
42. National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933) (invalidated 1935).
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unanimously against the Government on two grounds-that the
authority was an improper delegation of legislative power and
that it overreached the commerce power.43
The case involved transactions in the Brooklyn chicken
market. This was the polar counterpart of production, for inter-
state commerce was deemed to have come to an end before the
defendants engaged in the slaughtering and local sales that were
the subjects of the regulations at issue. That in itself did not end
the matter, for there remained the question of whether the effects
of the regulated activities sufficiently affected interstate com-
merce to justify the regulation. The entire Court, however, be-
lieved that the connection of the code to interstate commerce
was too slight to warrant federal regulation.
The narrow argument made by the Board was that the
wages and hours of workers in the local chicken market affected
interstate commerce because an employer paying low wages or
demanding long hours was able to charge low prices, and that
this would lead to demand for a cheaper quality of goods.44 The
argument was not persuasive-lower distribution costs would
mean that there was less of a cost wedge between producer and
consumer, and so could make room for better quality product-
and in any event was very attenuated.
The Board also made broader-based arguments, that state
legislation establishing high labor standards would be deterred
by the belief that commerce would be diverted elsewhere unless
such standards were established generally, and that wage main-
tenance was necessary to stimulate national economic recov-
ery.45 But no member of the Court was then disposed to accept
such far-reaching theories, especially in the context of a case
testing the constitutionality of the National Recovery Admini-
stration, the Blue Eagle, an agency of such broad power that
even liberal members of the Court found it frightening. 46 Car-
dozo's concurrence, joined by Stone, indicated no significant
disagreement with Hughes's majority opinion, though Hughes
(presumably to accommodate the Court's conservative four-
43. Schechter, 295 U.S. at 551.
44. Id. at 549-50.
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE 619
(1946).
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some) used the old-fashioned direct-indirect language and Car-
dozo emphasized that the matter was one of degree.-
The next year, in Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,48 the Court
had a better opportunity to address the issue. The case involved
a challenge to the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935.
The Act imposed a heavy sales tax on bituminous coal, but re-
bated most of it to operators who complied with a code formu-
lated according to statutory directives. A majority of the
Court-the conservative four plus Justice Roberts-held that la-
bor provisions of the Code were unconstitutional and that the
rest of the Act was inseverable from them.49 The opinion, by
Justice Sutherland, had a hard edge: The labor provisions regu-
lated production, production was a local activity, it could not be
considered in the stream of commerce, nor was there, as in the
union cases, an intent to restrain commerce, and the effects of
the regulated activities on commerce could not be deemed di-
rect. However extensive the effects on commerce might be was
immaterial, for "the matter of degree has no bearing upon the
question here.' °50 Hughes wrote a cryptic concurrence that con-
clusorily agreed that one of the labor provisions was unconstitu-
tional, in part because it "goes beyond any proper measure of
protection of interstate commerce and attempts a broad regula-
tion of industry within the State." 51 But ultimately Hughes dis-
sented, because he believed that marketing provisions of the
Code, establishing the price at which the coal could be sold in
interstate commerce, were constitutional and severable from the
labor provisions and provided sufficient basis to uphold the tax.
Justice Cardozo, joined by Justices Brandeis and Stone, agreed
with these latter conclusions, and thus voted to uphold the tax
without reaching the question of the validity of the labor provi-
sions.
52
One year later, in 1937, in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 53 the result was dramatically different. The National La-
47. Schechter, 295 U.S. at 551-55 (Cardozo, J., concurring).
48. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
49. Id. at312-16.
50. Id. at 308.
51. Id. at 318-19 (Hughes, C.J., concurring).
52. Id. at 324 (Cardozo, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
53. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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bor Relations Act, like the Coal Act, regulated labor relations in
productive industries. This time, however, five members of the
Court voted to uphold the statute, in an opinion by Hughes, with
Cardozo and the liberals joining. I regard attempts to reconcile
the decision with Carter Coal as quite unconvincing. 54 Indeed,
the first part of McReynolds's dissent, joined by the other con-
servatives, is little more than a reproduction of the decisions of
three circuit courts of appeals, in Jones & Laughlin and two
companion cases, and each of those amounts to an extended ci-
tation of Carter Coal. It appears to me that for Roberts, the de-
cision represents a sharp break in his thinking about national
powers-whether because of the pendency of President Roose-
velt's Court-packing proposal is another matter.55 But for the
liberals, the decision represented no change at all-they had not
opined on the validity of the labor provisions in Carter Coal,
and one would expect them to be receptive to the expansionary
holding of Jones & Laughlin.
As to Hughes, I have argued elsewhere that his separate
and mysterious opinion in Carter Coal, rather than his majestic
opinion for the Court in Jones & Laughlin, is the aberration, one
perhaps best explained by his attempt to deflect criticism from
56the Court. Indeed, he made no serious attempt to reconcile the
two cases, and instead essentially shrugged Carter Coal aside.
57
There can be little doubt that for Hughes, the decision was in ac-
cordance with his long-held views. It was he, of course, who
had established in the Shreveport Rate Cases58 nearly a quarter
century before that a "close and substantial" effect of an eco-
nomic nature on interstate commerce was sufficient to justify
congressional power. And in 1933 he had made clear that pro-
duction could have that kind of impact on commerce; in Appala-
chian Coals, Inc. v. United States,-59 he had written: "When in-
dustry is grievously hurt, when producing concerns fail, when
54. See Richard D. Friedman, Switching Time and Other Thought Experiments: The
Hughes Court and Constitutional Transformation, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1891, 1968 n.393
(1994).
55. See id. at 1967-74 (concluding that Roberts's votes were probably not substan-
tially affected either by the Court-packing battle or by the election of 1936).
56. See id. at 1962-63.
57. See id. at 1965-66.
58. 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
59. 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
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unemployment mounts and communities dependent upon profit-
able production are prostrated, the wells of commerce go dry.",
60
Putting those two propositions together, the result appears clear:
Even though production is not deemed to be part of commerce,
Congress can regulate production when, as will often be true, the
effect of production on commerce is a substantial one. Though
in Schechter, Hughes had used categorical language, probably to
keep the conservatives in line, now he said-contrary to Suther-
land's opinion in Carter Coal-that the matter is "necessarily
one of degree," and instead of speaking in direct-indirect terms
he said that Congress may regulate matters intrastate in charac-
ter "if they have such a close and substantial relation to inter-
state commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to
protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions."6
Thus, Hughes wrote, "the fact that the employees here con-
cerned were engaged in production is not determinative." 62 The
question was as to effects, and the answer seemed clear:
When industries organize themselves on a national scale,
making their relation to interstate commerce the dominant
factor in their activities, how can it be maintained that their
industrial labor relations constitute a forbidden field into
which Congress may not enter when it is necessary to pro-
tect interstate commerce from the paralyzing consequences
of industrial war?
63
Jones & Laughlin thus was a major development, one with
enormous consequences for the effective scope of federal power.
But it was what one would have expected had Carter Coal not
been decided the year before, or at least if Schechter and Carter
Coal had not been decided in the two preceding years. Its theo-
retical contribution lay in excising a categorical rule-that pro-
duction lies beyond federal power-that no longer fit well with
the general principles governing congressional power over inter-
state commerce. Jones & Laughlin was thus comparable to the
Court's decision three years before in Nebbia v. New York.6 4
Nebbia had also excised a categorical rule that no longer fit with
60. Id. at 372.
61. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 37.
62. Id. at 40.
63. Id. at 41.
64. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
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the general theory: It showed that there was a general principle
presumptively favoring the validity of state regulations of eco-
nomic matters, 65 that there was nothing "sacrosanct" about
prices, 66 and therefore no reason to attempt to preserve a rule
barring price regulation except for a limited list of industries "af-
fected with a public interest., 67 Jones & Laughlin, like Nebbia,
was a crucial decision, but in both cases the achievement was
not in adopting a new broad theory, but in discarding a narrow
and restrictive rule of great practical importance that fit poorly
with broad and more receptive principles.68
In the few years after Jones & Laughlin, the Court decided
several cases that built on it.69 None created much difficulty un-
til United States v. Darby.70 There, the Court, in an opinion by
Justice Stone, rejected a challenge to the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938. The Court was unanimous, Justice McReynolds,
the last of the four conservatives, having retired just two days
before. The first part of the opinion consisted largely of an
adoption of the position that four justices had taken nearly a
quarter century before in Hammer v. Dagenhart,7 1 that Congress
could bar the shipment across state lines of goods made under
labor conditions it deemed substandard. Certainly there was
65. Id. at 523-28.
66. Id. at 529.
67. Id. at 532-37. I am using Nebbia only by way of analogy here; I do not believe
there is any causal connection between the two cases, at least not a strong one. There was
a due process issue in Jones & Laughlin, but the case did not involve price regulation and
the decision did not depend on Nebbia. Jones & Laughlin did not cite either Nebbia or any
other case decided after it. See also supra note 25.
68. The Jones & Laughlin opinion explicitly disclaimed reliance on the "stream of
commerce" theory. 301 U.S. at 36. This was a point emphasized by Hughes the next year.
Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. NLRB, 303 U.S. 453, 464 (1938) ("[A]s we said in the
Jones & Laughlin Case, the instances in which the metaphor of a 'stream of commerce' has
been used are but particular, and not exclusive, illustrations of the protective power which
Congress may exercise.").
69. See Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940) (upholding Bi-
tuminous Coal Conservation Act of 1937); Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38 (1939) (uphold-
ing Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938); Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 (1939) (upholding
Tobacco Inspection Act of 1935); Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938) (up-
holding the National Labor Relations Act as applied to utility company selling power intra-
state only); Santa Cruz, 303 U.S. at 464 (elaborating on the "well established principle" of
Jones & Laughlin).
70. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
71. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
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nothing revolutionary here, even though the result was to over-
rule Dagenhart.
The opinion went beyond, however, for the statute not only
prohibited the shipment in interstate commerce of goods made
under substandard conditions, but imposed wage and hour re-
quirements with respect to all employees engaged in production
of goods for interstate commerce. Justice Stone first upheld
these requirements by enunciating a remarkable two-step: Con-
gress, having prohibited the interstate transportation of goods
produced under substandard conditions, could choose "means
reasonably adapted to the attainment of the permitted end,, 72 in
this case by "stop[ping] the initial step toward transportation,
production with the purpose of so transporting it." 73 The logic
has some force, and yet it has an inverted quality; clearly, Con-
gress's primary goal was to prescribe labor conditions, and the
shipment ban was a means that took advantage of constitutional
doctrine to achieve that end, but Stone's opinion treats the pro-
duction ban as if it were a means of effectuating the shipment
ban. In any event, Stone declared that the production ban could
also be upheld independently of the shipment ban, and here the
argument was more straightforward. Congress aimed at pre-
venting
the spread of substandard labor conditions through the use
of the facilities of interstate commerce for competition by
the goods so produced with those produced under the pre-
scribed or better labor conditions[,] and the consequent dis-
location of the commerce itself caused by the impairment
or destruction of local businesses bY competition made ef-
74fective through interstate commerce.
Given recognition of an aggregation effect-that "competition
by a small part may affect the whole and that the total effect of
the competition of many small producers may be great," a pro-
hibition on the production of goods made under substandard
conditions was "so related to the commerce and so affects it as
to be within the reach of the commerce power.
75
72. Id. at 121.
73. Id. at 117.
74. Id. at 122.
75. Id. at 123.
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This holding culminated in a declaration that Carter Coal
had been limited in principle by subsequent cases. But it was
Schechter that this portion of the opinion seemed most directly
to contradict. In Schechter, none of the justices had been willing
to accept an argument of this sort; in Darby all nine of them, in-
cluding the three holdovers, Hughes, Stone, and Roberts, did.
What accounts for the difference? Darby was presented in a far
less threatening context than Schechter had been, because it in-
volved a much narrower statute and one that did not create a
wholesale assumption or delegation of power. Moreover, the
doctrinal landscape had shifted dramatically. Once Jones &
Laughlin established that Congress could regulate labor relations
in production if they had a sufficient impact on interstate com-
merce, and subsequent cases had consolidated this development,
a broad-based argument of the type adopted by Stone in Darby
seemed to follow much more naturally than it had before.
Darby, then, was an advancement, but it was hardly revolu-
tionary. It did not suggest-and no subsequent case has sug-
gested-that production is commerce, or that a substantial rela-
tionship to commerce is not essential to justify congressional
regulation under the Commerce Clause. The lower court that
decided a companion case to Darby had upheld the statute,76 and
Justice Douglas's clerk noted briefly before the Court took the
case that the statute was probably constitutional. Roberts, the
most conservative member of the Court after the departure of
McReynolds, seemed to have no difficulty with the case.78
Hughes did. At argument, he discussed the case at length, call-
ing it "the most important case we have had by far in connection
with the commerce power," but when it came time to vote he
passed. 79 Hughes's hesitation was motivated in large part by the
76. Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Adm'r, 111 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. 1940), aff'd, 312 U.S. 126
(1941).
77. Clerk's Memorandum, No. 82, United States v. F. W. Darby Lumber Co. (Oct.
term, 1940) (William 0. Douglas MSS, Box 52, on file with Manuscript Division, Library
of Congress).
78. See Conference Notes, No. 82, United States v. F. W. Darby Lumber Co. (Dec. 21,
1940) (William 0. Douglas MSS, Box 52, on file with Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress); Conference Notes, No. 82, United States v. F. W. Darby Lumber Co. (Dec. 21,
1940) (Frank Murphy Papers, Red 123, on file with Bentley Historical Library, Ann Arbor,
Michigan) [hereinafter Murphy conference notes].
79. Murphy conference notes, supra note 78.
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fact that the scope of the statute seemed too vague, especially for
application in a criminal case. After Stone circulated his draft
opinion, Hughes wrote to him expressing his misgivings. But as
to fundamental theory he seemed to have no doubt; he began his
letter saying, "You have written a strong opinion, again setting
forth with suitable elaboration the general principles which we
have held should govern the exercise of the commerce power."
80
And on the proofs of Stone's opinion in the companion case, a
civil one, Hughes wrote, "Very careful and satisfactory.'
There was no revolution here, either.
Finally, we come to the celebrated case of Wickard v. Fil-
burn,82 in which a farmer challenged the Government's attempt
to count wheat consumed on the farm in his marketing allotment
under the second Agricultural Adjustment Act. Wickard pre-
sented a significant problem of proof-that is, to justify the re-
straint, the Government had to show that wheat consumed on the
farm genuinely, or at least plausibly, had a significant impact on
market prices. But the Government was able to make a more
than credible case on this point.
The amount of farm-consumed wheat was substantial, and
so it was reasonable to conclude that farmers growing wheat on
the farm and consuming it, rather than their presumed next-best
alternative of buying wheat on the market, had a non-trivial im-
pact on wheat prices. Indeed, it is almost certain that the regula-
tors believed that the impact of farm-consumed wheat was sub-
stantial, because they had no other plausible reason to regulate
the activity. In this sense, the case stood on a stronger footing
than either Darby or the later civil rights cases. In those cases, it
is reasonable to infer that Congress's principal interest was in
the local impact of the activities being regulated and not their ef-
fect on commerce, and so a plausible argument could be made
that Congress was invoking the commerce power as a pretext;
not so in Wickard.
80. Letter from Charles Evans Hughes to Harkan Fiske Stone (Jan. 27, 1941) (Harlan
Fiske Stone MSS, Box 66, on file with Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
81. Id.
82. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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Given the apparent effect of farm-consumed wheat, the
case was actually a rather easy one conceptually.83 Regulation
of consumption on the farm was not beyond federal power be-
cause the production and consumption were themselves local ac-
tivities, or because their impact on interstate commerce was
economic and could be characterized as indirect. To a large ex-
tent, the result in Wickard had already been foreshadowed by the
Court's decision in Mulford v. Smith,84 a case, like Wickard, that
concerned the constitutionality of an application of the quota
system under the second Agricultural Adjustment Act. In Mul-
ford, the Court held that tobacco allotments could validly count
all sales, whether destined for interstate or intrastate com-
merce. 8 It is noteworthy also that the two lower court judges in
the Wickard case who held against the statute did not opine on
the Commerce Clause ground-they held that a statutory change
that increased the penalties on farmers who produced in excess
of their allotments operated retroactively and in doing so vio-
lated due process 86-and the one dissenter thought the allotment
posed no problem under the Commerce Clause.87 Cushman
shows that the Supreme Court contemplated remanding the case
for further findings, but in the end, after holding reargument, the
Court decided it unanimously in favor of the Government, with-
out need for remand. 88  Justice Roberts again raised no objec-
tion.
Cushman also shows that Justice Jackson contemplated
writing a blunt opinion in which the Court would essentially an-
83. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000) (holding that Congress may
not "regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's aggre-
gate effect on interstate commerce") puts a bound on application of the style of reasoning
applied in Wickard. But it did not purport to affect Wickard itself, because, following
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), it characterized the activity involved in
Wickardas economic. Id. at 610 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560).
84. 307 U.S. 38.
85. Id. at 47-48.
86. Filbum v. Helke, 43 F. Supp. 1017, 1019 (S.D. Ohio 1942).
87. Id. at 1021-23 (Allen, J., dissenting). Note particularly this statement:
Since regulation of the supply of wheat available for sale in interstate commerce
but actually used within the state of its origin is drawn into a general plan for the
protection of interstate commerce in the commodity from the interferences, bur-
dens and obstructions arising from excessive surplus and the social evils of low
values, the power of Congress extends to it as well.
Id. at 1023 (Allen, J., dissenting).
88. Cushman, supra note 25, at 1138.
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nounce complete deference to Congress. 89 But Jackson was an
inveterate second-guesser, who seemed to revel in changing his
mind.90 It would be a mistake to assume that his musings repre-
sented his settled views, much less the settled views of the
Court. The opinion he actually wrote for the Court essentially
follows the framework laid out by the cases decided in the pre-
ceding few years, and explicitly requires a "substantial" impact
on commerce. Thus, Wickard did not detach the jurisprudence
of the Commerce Clause from its language in the way that the
Court had done with the Eleventh Amendment, with the Con-
tracts Clause, and even with respect to the Commerce Clause it-
self, in establishing that Congress can regulate a matter that is
not commerce so long as it has a sufficient effect on commerce.
Consider, for example, the following passage that is reminiscent
of Hughes's majority opinion in Home Building & Loan Ass 'n v.
Blaisdell,91 Cardozo's unpublished concurrence in the same
case,92 and Roberts's majority opinion in Nebbia93:
In earlier times, it was thought that the Commerce Clause
could not support an exercise of Congressional power
unless the Court was satisfied that the particular activity
regulated bore a "direct" or "close and substantial" relation
to commerce among the states. Moreover, the conception
of commerce was a narrow one, excluding productive in-
dustries. But time and experience have taught that such a
89. Id.
90. In a 1999 book review of JEFFREY D. HOCKETT, NEW DEAL JUSTICE: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF HUGO L. BLACK, FELIX FRANKFURTER, AND
ROBERT H. JACKSON (1996), I wrote about Jackson that he
seems to have had a strong sense of whimsy that affected his jurisprudence. "If
there are other ways of gracefully and good-naturedly surrendering former views
to a better considered position," he wrote in one case, after listing several such
ways from old cases, "I invoke them all." McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 US 162,
177-78 (1950) (concurring). And in a memorandum quoted by Hockett (p. 287),
he wrote, "If it should become necessary to revise my views I shall prove that I
am then right by declaring that I have theretofore been wrong. I would not be
without precedent."
Richard D. Friedman, Three New Deal Justices, at
http://www2.h-net.msu.edu/reviews/showrev.cgi?path=24967916774028 (Jan. 1999).
91. 290 U.S. 398, 442-44 (1934).
92. Excerpts from this draft are reproduced in PAUL BREST, ET AL., PROCESSES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 423-24 (4th ed. 2000).
93. 291 U.S. at 536 ("The phrase 'affected with a public interest' can, in the nature of
things, mean no more than that an industry, for adequate reason, is subject to control for the
public good.").
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cramped view of commerce, and of Congress's power un-
der the Commerce Clause, however well they fit the world
of the Framers, do not satisfy the needs of the modem day.
To say that a matter is within Congress's power to regulate
''commerce among the states" means nothing more than
that the matter is one that Congress reasonably believed
was a matter of national concern calling for exercise of the
national legislative power.
The Wickard opinion actually included nothing of the sort, of
course; this language is my own draft, suggesting how a more
aggressive opinion might have obviated the need for inquiry into
effects on commerce. But Wickard did not do this. By continu-
ing to operate within the rubric of the effects doctrine, it assured
that, though the outcome would usually be a foregone conclu-
sion, subsequent cases would continue to look for the connection
between the matter regulated and commerce.
Wickard did express the position that it is enough if there is
sufficient support for Congress to regard the impact on com-
merce as substantial; it is not necessary that the Court reach that
conclusion independently. But this position was hardly revolu-
tionary. Note the following language from United Mine Work-
ers v. Coronado Coal Co., 4 articulating a principle deemed to
be clear from earlier cases and quoted by Hughes in Jones &
Laughlin: "[I]f Congress deems certain recurring practices,
though not really part of interstate commerce, likely to obstruct,
restrain, or burden it, it has the power to subject them to national
supervision and restraint., 95 And, for that matter, Wickard did
not establish this position with complete clarity; more than two
decades later, in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,
96
Justice Black referred to the question of substantial effects as
"ultimately a judicial decision. ' 7
One further point suggests the lack of revolutionary quality
of Wickard: The case is a high-water mark of sorts. It remains
the paradigm of an aggressive use of federal power controlling
94. 259 U.S. 344 (1922) [hereinafter Coronado 1].
95. Id at 408, quoted in Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 40.
96. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
97. Id at 273 (Black, J., concurring); see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614; Lopez, 514
U.S. at 557 n.2.
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local activity. 98  The law did not move beyond Wickard, or at
least not very far beyond, because Wickard took it nearly as far
as it could go. The decision was a culmination, not a progenitor.
Had it never arisen, neither the outcome nor the rhetoric of later
decisions would likely have been substantially different.
IV. THE LATEST TURN
The New Deal cases, we have seen, continued to articulate
a demand that there be a real nexus between the matter regulated
and interstate commerce. Later actors took seriously the need to
show this nexus. Congress assiduously built legislative histories
showing the relationship of the regulated matters to commerce,
99
and set the bounds of statutes to require or indicate the connec-
tion. l°° Litigators defending statutes did not treat the matter per-
functorily; they poured considerable energy into demonstrating
the nexus.101 And Supreme Court justices also treated the matter
seriously. Decisions upholding statutes as regulations of com-
merce carefully worked through their justifications.'0 2 Occa-
98. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560 (calling Wickard "perhaps the most far reaching ex-
ample of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity").
99. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 872, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), at 17-22 (supporting civil
rights bill, demonstrating adverse impact on commerce of discrimination in public accom-
modations); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 628-36 (Souter, J., dissenting) (summarizing portions of
legislative history of Violence Against Women Act of 1994 that showed the effects of vio-
lence against women on interstate commerce)..
100. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2000), codifying a portion of P.L. 99-308,
100 Stat 449 (1986), provides that it is unlawful for certain persons, including convicted
felons, "to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting
commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has
been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce." Title II of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2000), prohibiting discrimination in places of public ac-
commodation, is limited to those operations that "affect commerce" or in which discrimi-
nation is supported by state action. Subsection (c) contains a detailed definition of the cir-
cumstances in which the operations of an establishment are deemed to affect commerce.
Thus, with respect to a restaurant or gasoline station, the operations of the facility are
deemed to affect commerce if "it serves or offers to serve interstate travelers of a substan-
tial portion of the food which it serves, or gasoline or other products which it sells, has
moved in commerce." 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(c).
101. See, e.g., Brief for the United States, Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379
U.S. 241 (1964) (No. 64-515), reprinted in 60 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 38, at 347,
passim; see also Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
102. See e.g., United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689 (1948); Heart of Atlanta Motel v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
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sionally a1ustice dissented from a decision in favor of the Gov-ernment.10
Thus, there was always a possibility that, sooner or later, a
majority of the Court would rule that Congress had transcended
the broad limits on its power. When that happened, in United
States v. Lopez1°4 and United States v. Morrison, ° 5 the majority
was able to achieve the result without overruling any prece-
dents-because, however much the Court had deferred to Con-
gress in the six decades following NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp. ,l06 it had continued to articulate limits on congres-
sional power, limits to which the four dissenting justices in Lo-
pez and Morrison, as well as the majority, continued to sub-
scribe.'07
Just as the great developments of the New Deal era oc-
curred without any major discontinuities, then, it appears to me
that the retrenchment begun by Lopez is largely continuous with
prior law. That is not to deny that Lopez and Morrison mark a
significant turning and shift of mood; clearly they do. I only
mean that the New Deal cases left enough substance in the ar-
ticulated limits on congressional power that later justices in-
clined to cut back on that power could do so while still pur ort-
ing to subscribe to the framework provided by those cases.
103. See Perez v. United States, 492 U.S. 146, 157 (1971) (Stewart, J., dissenting);
Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 309 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting).
104. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
105. 529 U.S. 598.
106. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
107. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 616-18 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (indicating that the Com-
merce Clause should not permit Congress to regulate something merely by finding it to be
related to commerce); Ronald D. Rotunda, The Implications of the New Commerce Clause
Jurisprudence. An Evolutionary or Revolutionary Court?, 55 ARK. L. REv. 795, 836
(2003) (noting that Justice Breyer, in his dissent in Lopez, rejected a broader argument that
everything is commerce).
108. See Jesse H. Choper & John C. Yoo, the Scope of the Commerce Clause after
Morrison, 25 OKLA. CITY U.L. REv. 843, 854 (2000) ("Despite... ringing rhetoric, Mor-
rison, like Lopez before it, represents an evolution rather than a revolution.") By character-
izing Congress's power under the Commerce Clause as reaching three broad categories of
activity, Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59, the Court elaborated on the pre-existing framework
and may have made it significantly less supple and capacious. Interestingly, this categori-
zation was drawn closely from Perez, a notably expansionist opinion, though Lopez sug-
gests that it is exclusive, see 514 U.S. at 558 ("we have identified three broad categories of
activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce power"), and Perez clearly leaves
open the possibility that it is not. Id. at 150 ("The Commerce Clause reaches, in the main,
three categories of problems.") (emphasis added).
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V. EQUILIBRIUM
What will the long-term significance of United States v.
Lopez109 and United States v. Morrison1° be? Speculation on
that question may be aided by considering the durability of the
doctrine of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause that
was reached by the decisions of the late 1930s. I contend that
this doctrine constituted, and perhaps still constitutes, an equilib-
rium. By this, I mean not only that the doctrine was stable, but
that it resulted from various forces that tended-and still tend-
to push the doctrine towards this result. Principal among those
forces are the following:
First is a growing sense over many years of how substantial
the need for national power is, and diminishing suspicion of the
dangers of such power. Of course, the question of the ideal
scope of the Federal Government continues to be a significant
matter of debate, and probably will continue to be so for the
foreseeable future, and beyond. But there has been an enormous
change over the last century and a half. Before the Civil War
many Americans had greater allegiance to their state than to the
nation, but that is true no longer. Now the lines have expanded;
most Americans are still unwilling to cede substantial authority
to international authorities. At the same time, most Americans
expect their national government to be a muscular one, capable
of addressing problems of broad impact. The history of railroad
regulation explored in this conference by Professor James Ely
illustrates the change."' There has never been a strong constitu-
tional restraint against the Federal Government regulating the
railroads, which are the classic instrument of interstate com-
merce. And yet, as Professor Ely shows, in the early years po-
litical restraints made railroad regulation mainly a matter of state
law; over time, however, the benefits of national regulation be-
came more apparent and the dangers appeared less salient, so by
the early twentieth century the national government was the
dominant regulator of the railroads.
109. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
110. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
111. James W. Ely, Jr., "the railroad system has burst through State limits ": Rail-
roads andInterstate Commerce, 1830-1920, 55 ARK. L. REV. 933 (2003).
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Second is hesitancy on the part of the judiciary to exercise
power against the political branches. Of course, the judiciary
sometimes does exercise such power, but aggressive exercises
entail significant potential costs in political friction and in the
courts' claim to legitimacy. 112  Those costs will often appear
more worthwhile if the case involves what may be called a
"rights constituency" that can make a strong claim that failure to
exercise the power will deprive it of a significant right. Even
absent such a constituency, the courts will sometimes exercise
their power against the political branches-the current Supreme
Court certainly has done so repeatedly-but over the long term,
deference offers the path of least resistance.
Third is what might be called doctrinal entropy. The at-
tempt to erect doctrinal structures with sharp dividing lines-
like the ones that purported to bar federal regulation of produc-
tion or, more generally, activities with only an indirect effect on
commerce-is unlikely to succeed under the pressure of cases
that reveal such distinctions to have little bearing on whether the
Federal Government should be permitted to regulate a given
area. The breakdown of those doctrinal walls means that the law
inevitably becomes a matter of degree.
Fourth is the demand of intellectual consistency. Once the
doctrine is defined in terms of effects on commerce, rather than
being limited to regulation of commerce itself, it is difficult to
find any stopping point that is defensible, articulable, and en-
forceable, short of extremely broad deference to Congress.
Lopez and Morrison may reflect a shift towards another
equilibrium that will also prove durable, but I am dubious. Pre-
diction over the long run can only be speculative, especially
given how much it depends on the question of who the Supreme
Court justices will be. It seems very probable, however, that the
forces that I have just described will still persist. If they do, they
will tend to counteract any departures from the equilibrium
reached, after a century and a half of uneven but ultimately irre-
112. I mean here to be echoing Jesse Choper. See generally JESSE H. CHOPER,
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL
RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1980) (arguing that the Su-
preme Court must exercise judicial review to protect individual rights, which are not ade-
quately represented in the political process, but that the Court should decline to do so when
it is unnecessary for the effective preservation of our constitutional scheme).
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sistible development, by the Supreme Court of the New Deal
era. 1
1 3
113. The contention by Professors Denning and Reynolds that Lopez and Morrison
have had less impact in the lower courts than might be expected may support this view.
See Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Rulings and Resistance: The New Com-
merce Clause Jurisprudence Encounters the Lower Courts, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1253 (2003).
In commenting on the draft of this paper presented by Professor Denning at the conference,
Adrian Vermeule cautioned against drawing conclusions of hostility to Lopez and Morrison
from the simple fact that the subsequent ratio of decisions rejecting Commerce Clause
challenges to decisions sustaining them is small.
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